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The Effect of CEOs’ Characteristics on Forward-Looking 
Information (FLI) 
Abstract 
Manuscript Type - Empirical 
Purpose - This paper aims to examine the effect of CEOs’ characteristics on the level of FLI 
disclosure.  
Design/methodology/approach - The study uses a disclosure index to measure the level of 
FLI and employs random-effect and panel data regressions to examine the relationship 
between CEOs’ characteristics and the level of FLI disclosure. The sample consists of 201 
non-financial companies listed on the Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) for the period 2008-
2013.  
Findings - The results show that the CEO age has a significant negative relationship with the 
level of FLI, whereas gender and overconfidence have a significant positive association with 
it.  
Practical implications - The results could be beneficial for a number of users of financial 
information, such as regulators, investors, auditors and lenders to make better decisions.  
Originality/value – The current study offers evidence of the effect of CEO characteristics on 
the level of FLI disclosure statements, particularly through narrative disclosures. 
Keywords - Voluntary disclosure, FLI, annual reports, Jordan. 
Paper type - Research paper   
1 Introduction 
Voluntary disclosure, such as FLI, is considered essential in demonstrating a company’s 
position to shareholders, and other stakeholders in the wider sense of the term (Jensen and 
Meckling 1976; Lim et al. 2007; Hassanein and Hussainey 2015). In fact, a number of studies 
argue that the most significant items in voluntary disclosure are FLI (Francis et al. 2008a; 
Wang and Hussainey 2013). We extend the previous literature on FLI disclosure by 
investigating the effect of CEOs’ characteristics on narrative FLI disclosure. We focused on 
forward-looking narrative because existing evidence suggests that managers who are willing 
to manipulate the tone of corporate disclosure are likely to target forward-looking statements 
for such purposes (Schleicher et al. 2007; Schleicher and Walker 2010). Thus, our study 
differs from previous studies on FLI disclosure in that we focus exclusively on how the 
personal characteristics of CEOs affect the voluntary narrative FLI. Previous studies suggest 
that corporate reporting practices vary predictably, in accordance with the particular 
individual characteristics of directors (Schrand and Zechman 2012; Davidson et al. 2013), 
and that these characteristics have an effect on managers’ decisions, including their influence 
on voluntary disclosure strategies (Bamber et al. 2010), accruals quality (Francis et al. 2008a) 
and accounting policies (Thankom et al. 2015).  
Disclosure regarding a company’s future performance is mostly made on a voluntary basis, 
subject to managerial discretion (Clarkson et al. 2008). Although previous studies found that 
FLI disclosure enhances investors’ ability to predict future earnings (Hussainey et al. 2003; 
Hussainey and Walker 2009; Athanasakou and Hussainey 2014), academic research has 
shown that no study has used the level of FLI disclosure to investigate the relationship 
between CEO characteristics and voluntary disclosure. This limitation provides the 
motivation for the present study, by providing evidence on the nature of the 
relationship between FLI discloasure and CEO characteristics in the context of Jordan. 
Furthermore, we were motivated by the unique role the CEOs can play in FLI statements, 
particularly through narrative disclosures.  
We define FLI disclosure more widely and include all types of FLI disclosure, including 
management strategy, valuations of opportunities and risks, forecast data, qualitative and 
non-forecast data. This sort of approach is useful for the study is based on Jordanian 
companies, whose forward-looking statements are qualitative in nature and dominated by 
good news. We used 1,206 annual reports of 201 privatized Jordanian companies listed on the 
ASE over the six-year period, 2008-2013, with the technique of manual content analysis to 
examine the narrative evidence from the annual financial reports. 
It was found that CEO overconfidence and gender have a significant positive association with 
the level of FLI disclosure, while CEO age is negatively associated with FLI disclosure. The 
study provides early evidence of the impact of CEO characteristics on the level of FLI 
disclosure in a developing country. Other than researchers, the findings should be of interest 
to policymakers and regulators regarding the impact of CEO characteristics on the level of 
FLI in Jordan and in other developing countries, particularly in the Middle East and North 
Africa (MENA).  
Jordan is significant in the MENA region as a pioneering service-based economy, largely 
because of its relative scarcity of natural resources. While other economies in the region are 
characterised by heavy state regulation and massive government bureaucracies (for political 
reasons, including the disbursal of oil and gas revenues), Jordan has pioneered the market 
economy and trade liberalization, along with its historic investment in education. Jordan is 
thus much more aligned to international norms in the globalized economy (Aljifri and 
Khasharmeh 2006). Over the years, the Jordanian government has worked closely with the 
IMF, practised careful monetary policy and made significant progress with privatization and 
a liberalized trade regime (Al-Akra and Ali 2012). The ASE, the biggest stock market in the 
region, operates an automated order-driven Electronic Trading System and works in close 
collaboration with the Jordan Securities Commission (JSC) on surveillance matters; it has a 
strong relationship with other exchanges, associations and international organizations.  
The Jordanian capital market is mature by regional standards and is integrated with the 
Middle East market, which implies little long-run risk diversification (Saadi-Sedik and Petri 
2006). The government of Jordan has introduced numerous reforms for accounting 
regulations, including securities exchange laws and corporate disclosure practices. These 
reforms contribute to more transparent markets and the listed companies have enhanced their 
voluntary disclosure (Al-Akra and Ali 2012; JSC 2015). Furthermore, Omar (2007) found 
that Jordan showed a significant improvement in disclosure after changes in the economic 
and accounting regulations (see Appendix 1). Thus, Jordan provides a unique national context 
in which to analyse the impact of CEO traits on the level of FLI disclosure.  
Our paper provides two contributions to the literature in terms of determinants of FLI 
disclosure. First, it examines the impact of CEOs’ personal traits on the level of FLI 
disclosure. Instead of the current literature’s prevailing focus on the determinants of FLI 
disclosure on institutional characteristics, this study provides evidence of the association 
between CEO traits and FLI disclosure. Second, most of the studies on FLI disclosure 
conducted in developed countries. This study contributes to the literature of FLI disclosure by 
providing new evidence in the context of developing countries. The remainder of this paper 
organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature and hypotheses, while Section 3 
presents the research method. Section 4 presents the study findings, and Section 5 presents 
the conclusion and suggestions for future research. 
The remainder of this paper organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature and 
hypotheses, while Section 3 presents the research method. Section 4 presents the study 
findings and Section 5 presents the conclusion and suggestions for future research.  
2 Literature Review and Hypotheses 
The disclosure of corporate information can be a signal to capital markets, as expressed in 
signalling theory, which posits that managers use voluntary disclosure to signal private 
information to the market (Watts and Zimmerman 1978). The sending of a signal is based on 
the assumption that it should be favourable to the signaller, such as indicating the higher 
quality of its products compared with those of competitors (Salama et al. 2010). Furthermore, 
companies disclose more specific information to investors to signal that they are better than 
other companies in the market for the purpose of attracting new investment and enhancing 
their reputation (Campbell 2001). In line with this argument, managers are likely to disclose 
more FLI to the interest-related parties to increase their confidence about the company’s 
future performance (Singhvi and Desai 1971). The last decade has seen a growing amount of 
research on the topic of managerial characteristics of CEOs. It is obvious that the 
sociological, professional, individual and physiological characteristics of managers may have 
an effect on various decisions (Bamber et al. 2010; Hirshleifer et al. 2012; Dejong and Ling 
2013). Since CEOs are the key decision makers in voluntary FLI disclosure, it is important to 
investigate the relationship between their personal characteristics and FLI disclosure, which 
remain ambiguous in the current literature. 
2.1 CEO Overconfidence 
The general climate of mistrust in corporate leadership since the 2008 financial crisis has 
resulted in significant research attention being devoted to the personal attributes of CEOs in 
recent years, particularly their overconfidence in corporate voluntary disclosure (Schrand and 
Zechman 2012; Ahmed and Duellman 2013). Langer (1975, 315) defined overconfidence as 
“an overestimation of one’s own abilities and outcomes relating to one’s personal situation”. 
Overconfidence as a personal characteristic tends to overestimate the results of one’s 
decisions, and underestimate the risks associated with those decisions. Previous literature 
suggests that individual overconfidence has two key aspects: miscalibration and 
overoptimism (Skala 2008; Libby and Rennekamp 2012). Miscalibration is associated with 
individuals underestimating uncertainty when predicting events (Hribar and Yang 2015).  
When individuals assess their relative skill, they tend to overstate their acumen relative to the 
average (Alicke 1985). This effect can extend to business decision making (Camerer and 
Lovallo 1999). While this is somewhat related to risk attitudes of individuals, it is also related 
to self-attribution bias, the tendency to attribute successful results from decisions to one’s 
own actions, and bad outcomes to external factors (Dowling and Aribi 2013). Overoptimism 
refers to individuals who are unrealistically optimistic about uncertain outcomes. 
Accordingly, the overconfident individual believes that an uncertain outcome will be better 
than what would be predicted by an unbiased expectation. Both aspects of overconfidence are 
likely to be associated with the level of FLI disclosure decisions.  
Schrand and Zechman (2012) used a sample of 49 firms subject to the US Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) accounting and auditing enforcement releases and examined 
the relationship between CEO overconfidence and overstatement of earnings. Their findings 
suggested that overconfident executives are more likely to exhibit an optimistic bias and thus 
are more likely to start down a slippery slope of issuing intentional misstatements. Similarly, 
Ahmed and Duellman (2013) examined the association between CEO overconfidence and 
accounting conservatism and suggested a negative relationship between CEO overconfidence 
and accounting conservatism among US firms. Since overconfident CEOs usually 
overestimate future sales and return on assets, their overconfidence encourages disclosing 
more information. In the same vein, Hribar and Yang (2015) examined the effect of 
overconfidence on management forecasting behaviour across US firms and found that 
overconfidence is positively associated with the decision to issue voluntary forecasts, and that 
their forecasts have a greater optimistic bias. Hence, an overconfident CEO is more likely to 
favour a high level of FLI disclosure.  
H1. A positive association exists between CEO overconfidence and the level of FLI disclosure 
among non-financial Jordanian companies. 
2.2 CEO Gender 
Previous literature has documented the existence of differences between males and females in 
terms of personality, communication style, decision making, risk-taking behaviour, 
leadership, ethics, expertise and general performance in business (Peterson and Philpot 2007; 
Dowling and Aribi 2013). The findings of these studies suggest that the gender of company 
executives has an influence on corporate decisions, and that female executives tend to take a 
different perspective and demand different information than their male counterparts. 
However, the extent to which gender influences corporate reporting decision-making 
differences remains unclear. For example, Ge et al. (2011) found no significant relationship 
between CFOs’ gender and accounting choices, while Krishnan and Parsons (2008) found 
that gender diversity in senior management affects earnings quality, increasing the quality of 
reported earnings. Similarly, Gul et al. (2011) examined whether the gender of directors 
affects fully independent audit committees’ ability to constrain earnings management and 
thus their effectiveness in overseeing the financial reporting, finding that the proportion of 
females on the audit committee is not associated with earnings management. Jia et al. (2014) 
investigated the relationship between the facial structure of CEOs and their companies’ 
financial misreporting, and the results showed that companies with CEOs who have more 
masculine faces have a higher incidence of financial misreporting. Recent studies by Ho et al. 
(2015) and Thankom et al. (2015) found that female directors tend to adopt more restrained 
earnings management, reflecting a proclivity toward more conservative accounting policies, 
and a generally more conservative mind-set among female CEOs characterised by a tendency 
to be less aggressive and more anxious.  
H2. The level of FLI disclosure is positively associated with the presence of male CEOs 
among non-financial Jordanian companies. 
2.3 CEO Age 
A number of studies have attempted to explain the relationship between CEO age and the 
decision-making process. For example, Miller and Shamsie (2001) found that older CEOs 
tend to take faster investment decisions due to their accumulated experience and knowledge. 
On the other hand, Bertrand and Schoar (2002) showed that olver CEOs (from cohorts with 
earlier year of birth) are more likely to be conservative in making investment decisions. Li et 
al. (2011) found that younger CEOs are likely to make more prolific investment decisions, 
since they need to signal their capability to the stakeholders, while Ge et al. (2011) provided 
evidence that older CEOs are more likely to use conservative accounting choices. Moreover, 
Bamber et al. (2010) reported that managers born before World War II are more likely to 
develop conservative disclosure styles than managers born afterwards. Lin et al. (2014) found 
a negative significant relationship between CEO age and internal control quality among 4,374 
non-financial US companies. There is no evidence so far on the relationship between the 
CEO age and the level of FLI dosclosure.  
H3. The level of FLI disclosure is negatively associated with CEOs’ age among non-financial 
Jordanian companies. 
3 Data and Methodology 
Our initial sample for the study is all 270 companies listed on the ASE. However, we 
excluded all financial companies (n = 42) from the initial sample, due to their unique 
characteristics and the specific regulations and disclosure requirements, which may have an 
impact on the results (Al-Akra and Hutchinson 2013; Athanasakou and Hussainey 2014; 
Hassanein and Hussainey 2015). In addition, industrial sectors comprising fewer than six 
firms and companies with missing data were removed from the initial sample (Athanasakou 
et al. 2009). Thus, the final sample consisted of 1,206 firm-year observations over the study 
period 2008-2013, as presented in Table 1. This study adopted a six-year period from 2008 to 
2013, since the financial crisis started in 2008 and triggered different reforms and corporate 
governance practices in the same year in Jordan. The data on FLI disclosure was collected 
from annual reports, each of which was scanned manually. The data on CEOs’ characteristics 
was collected from different sources: annual reports, press releases, and direct 
communication with analysts. Furthermore, to cover some missing financial information in 
the annual reports, databases available via the websites of the Securities Depository Centre, 
the ASE and OSIRIS were used. 
 
Insert Table 1 about sample description 
 
3.1 Measuring the Level of FLI Disclosure 
Content analysis, which has been extensively used in previous literature as a powerful tool to 
explore corporate disclosures (Hussainey et al. 2003; Aribi and Gao 2010; Menicucci 2013; 
Hassanein and Hussainey 2015), was utilized to gather and explore the items of FLI in the 
sample of this study. In content analysis, the selection of recording units such as sentences, 
words, lines, groups of words, pages, paragraphs or whole documents is necessary. This 
research uses words as a recording unit, since words are considered more reliable as a unit of 
analysis compared to longer alternatives (Hackston and Milne 1996; Al-Najjar and Abed 
2014). Furthermore, Ng (1985) argued that using sentences, lines, portion of pages and whole 
documents may be inappropriate because column, print and page sizes may differ from one 
annual report to another. Thus, to overcome these problems the current study used number of 
words as an unit of analysis.   
A keyword search was used to identify FLI items within voluntary section in each annual 
report. The study used a list of 35 forward-keywords established by Hussainey et al. (2003), 
such as anticipate, next period, coming period, next etc. (see Appendix 2). To allow content 
analysis to be used in a replicable manner, a checklist instrument with four categories 
describing the criteria for identifying disclosure as FLI was used in line with previous studies 
(Barako et al. 2006; Maali et al. 2006). Regarding the disclosure categories, Wallace and 
Naser (1996) and Francis et al. (2008b) reported that there is no consensus or general theory 
about categories to be selected for examining the extent of disclosure. The selection could be 
based on reviewing the literature or inspecting the content of FLI (Bryan 1997; Barako et al. 
2006). 
The categories and the list of FLI items included both financial and non-financial information 
disclosed by listed firms that may relate to FLI culminated in the generation of four 
categories and 45 items. Since the focus of this study is FLI, the preliminary four catagories 
and list of 45 items were sent to  various individuals chosen on the basis of their expertise and 
knowledge of accounting practices (academicians and accounting professionals). Based on 
valuable recommendations provided by them, the four categories of FLI were confirmed, but 
the initial list of 45 items was reduced to 28 items by clustering similar items into single ones. 
This method is consistent with previous literature (Barako et al. 2006; O’Sullivan et al. 2008; 
Menicucci 2013) (Appendix 3).  
Three steps were employed to ensure the reliability and validity of the content analysis 
process: (1) we developed a set of specified and explicit coding instruments to minimize 
discrepancies and ensure objectivity; (2) five annual reports were tested by several coders to 
ensure that all coders adopted the same coding procedures, to resolve any differences 
between codes; and (3) the coding rules for classification of categories and checklist items 
were re-confirmed by five different professional accountants, and the results compared to 
identify possible disagreements.  
Besides using the content analysis method, disclosure index was used to measure the extent 
of FLI. Cerf (1961) was the first study to employ disclosure index to assess the degree of 
corporate disclosure. Since the 1960s many researchers have extensively used disclosure 
index to measure the amount of information disclosed in annual financial reports (Maali et al. 
2006; Mathuva 2012; Athanasakou and Hussainey 2014). Our approach to scoring FLI items 
is dichotomous in that each FLI item scores a value of 1 if disclosed, otherwise 0; and the 
approach to scoring is equally weighted. The disclosure index was constructed as a ratio 
obtained by dividing the number of FLI items disclosed by the total number of FLI for each 
company (e.g. Cerf 1961; Rizk et al. 2008). 
This study used the following disclosure index to measure the level of FLI: 
FWD = Σdi 
Where FWD refers to the forward-looking category disclosed, and di = 1 if the category 
contains forward-looking items and zero if not.  
The FLI disclosure for each company is set as:  
FWD/TDS 
Where TDS is the maximum disclosure provided by the companies in their published annual 
financial reports.  
3.2 Independent Variables 
Three measures of overconfidence were used, the first of which focuses on option-holding 
behaviour and stock purchases. Following Malmendier and Tate (2008), we consider 
overconfidence as a reflection of the degree to which CEOs fail to minimize the degree to 
which their personal wealth is exposed to company-specific risk. Their measurement is based 
on the tendency of CEOs to purchase extra stock in their own company despite their own 
personal wealth, rendering them exposed to company risk at a high level. In buying more 
company stocks, CEOs expose themselves to higher levels of company risk by 
overestimating the prospective returns on their own projects in the belief that company stock 
price would rise more under their leadership than would normally be expected. If CEOs have 
such overconfident beliefs, they tend to buy up stock in the company in the hope of profiting 
from the expected future gains. Thus, we defined CEOs as overconfident based on the ‘Net 
Buyer’ Measure (i.e. based on whether they were net buyers of the stock of their own 
companies in the initial six years of the sample). It ought to be noted that in detecting 
overconfidence in CEOs, they are defined as being overconfident for all the relevant years. A 
dummy variable was established with 1 representing overconfident and 0 referring to 
otherwise. 
The second measurement of CEO overconfidence is based on CEO investment decisions. 
Previous studies document that companies’ investment decisions are associated with 
managerial overconfidence (Malmendier and Tate 2008; Campbell et al. 2011), and that 
overconfident CEOs are more likely to overinvest in capital projects (Malmendier and Tate 
2005a; Ben-David et al. 2010). Following Campbell et al. (2011) and Ahmed and Duellman 
(2013), we measured CEO overconfidence as a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if 
the company’s capital expenditure scaled by lagged total assets in a given year is higher than 
the median level of companies’ expenditures scaled by lagged total assets for the industry 
type in the same year, otherwise it takes the value 0. 
The third measurement of CEO confidence is based on financing decisions and capital 
structure. Overconfidence can significantly influence debt/equity choices, and overconfident 
CEOs will choose to issue more debt than their rational peers do, because of a belief that the 
firm is less likely to experience financial distress than it actually does  (Hackbarth 2008). In 
Fairchild's (2005) asymmetric information model, overconfidence ultimately leads to 
excessive use of debt (Minggui et al. 2006; Oliver and Mefteh 2010). In the same vein, 
Malmendier et al. (2007) indicated that overconfident managers use a higher level of debt 
than rational managers, thus they underestimate the expected cost of bankruptcy and take on 
more debt to exploit its tax benefits. We used the leverage ratio as a third proxy for 
overconfidence.  
The CEO gender is measured as a dummy variable with the value of 1 if the CEO is male and 
0 otherwise (Skalpe 2007; Yu et al. 2010). The study measures the CEO age as the difference 
between  date of birth and the years of the study period (Cornett et al. 2009; Lin et al. 2014). 
In addition to these dependent and independent variables, a number of control variables were 
used to control for the possible effect of a company’s characteristics and corporate 
governance factors that may affect the extent of FLI disclosure (Athanasakou and Hussainey 
2014; Sartawi et al. 2014; Hassanein and Hussainey 2015). 
3.3 Model Specification 
The study uses panel regression data to examine the relationship between the level of FLI 
disclosure and a CEO characteristics. The main regression model used is given by: 
Yit = β + bXit + Ɛit 
Where 
Y = Dependent variable (FLI), X = Independent and control variables (COVER, CAPEXP, 
FLEVER, CGEN, CAGE, FSIZE, FPROF, FINDU, FDIVID, BSIZE, BDUAL, BMEET, 
BINDEP, MOWNE, FOWNE, INSTIT, BLOCL), β + b = coefficients, i and t = cross-
sectional and time series dimensions, and Ɛ = error term. 
Three models are defined as follows: 
1. FLIit = β0 +  β 1 COVERit +  β 2 CGENit +  β 3 CAGEit+  β 4 FSIZEit +  β 5 FPROFit +   β 
6 FINDUit +  β 7 FDIVID + β 8 BSIZEit + β9 BDUALit + β10 BMEETit + β11 BINDEPit + 
β12 MOWNEit + β13 FOWNEit + β14 INSTITit + β15 BLOCKit + I  
2. FLIit =  β0 +  β 1 CAPEXPit +  β 2 CGENit +  β 3 CAGEit+  β 4 FSIZEit + β 5 FPROFit +  β 
6 FINDUit + β X7 FDIVID + β 8 BSIZEit + β9 BDUALit + β10 BMEETit + β11 BINDEPit 
+ β12 MOWNEit + β13 FOWNEit + β14 INSTITit + β15 BLOCKit + I  
3. FLIit =  β0 +  β 1 LEVERit +  β 2 CGENit +  β 3 CAGEt+  β 4 FSIZEit + β 5 FPROFit +  β 6 
FINDUit + β X7 FDIVID + β 8 BSIZEit + β9 BDUALit + β10 BMEETit + β11 BINDEPit + 
β12 MOWNEit + β13 FOWNEit + β14 INSTITit + β15 BLOCKit + I  
Where:  
FLIit = forward-looking disclosure index of company i in the year t, expressed as % total FLI 
disclosed out of all items. COVER = CEO overconfidence, the proportion of CEO share 
ownership, options, and stock exercise, measured using ‘Net Buyer’. CAPEXP = capital 
expenditures used as an alternative proxy for CEO overconfidence; this is a dummy variable 
taking the value 1 if the capital expenditure scaled by lagged total assets in year t is greater 
that the median level of capital expenditures to lagged total assets for the firm’s industry in 
that year. FLEVER = leverage ratio, used as another proxy for CEO overconfidence and 
measured by total long-term debt divided by total assets. CAGE = CEO age, measured by the 
difference between the CEO date of birth and years of the study period. CGEN = CEO 
gender, 1 if male and 0 if female. FSIZE = firm size, natural log of firm’s total assets. FPROF 
= profitability, measured by ROA (net income before tax divided be total assets). FINDU = 
industry type, from the ISIN, as stated by the Jordanian Securities Depository Centre (each 
company has a unique 10-digit number). FDIVID = dividends ratio measured as cash 
dividends divided by net income for the same period. BSIZE = board size, measured by the 
total numbers of the board. BDUAL = board duality, a dummy variable that takes the value 
of one if the CEO and chairperson are the same person and zero if otherwise. BMEET = 
board meeting, the number of meetings per year held by the board of directors. BINDEP = 
board independence, measured by the total number of outside directors. MOWNE = 
managerial ownership, measured by the percentage of total shares held by executive directors 
divided by the total number of shares. FOWNE = family ownership, measured by the 
proportion of total shares owned by the family; a dummy variable would take one if a family 
or an individual holds 10% or more of equity, and the value zero if otherwise. INSTIT = 
institutional ownership, measured by dummy variable which would take one if any 
institutional held shares, and zero if otherwise.  BLOCK = block-holders ownership, 
measured by a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the firm has an external 
stockholder owning 5% or more of the outstanding shares, and the value of zero if otherwise. 
β = the constant. Ε = residual error. 
4 Results and Discussion 
Table 2 shows key descriptive statistics for all variables used in the study. The minimum 
value of the FLI disclosure rate is 0%, and the maximum is 78%, which indicates a 
considerable dispersion in the rates. The mean value of 31.6% shows a low level of FLI 
disclosure across the companies. We used the median value 33% as a benchmark to classify 
the cutoff between high and low levels of FLI disclosure. In addition, Table 2 shows that 
43%, 49% and 29% of CEOs were overconfident about their company’s performance based 
on ‘Net Buyer’, capital expenditure and leverage ratio, respectively. The descriptive result 
shows that 95% of the CEOs are males. The mean age is 51.11 with minimum and maximum 
26 and 84 respectively, and the median value 51. The median age is used as a cutoff point to 
classify older and younger CEOs.  
The company size value indicates that the companies are widely dispersed. Profitability 
varies between a minimum value -85.90% (loss) and 95% (maximum profit), with standard 
deviation equal to 12.53%. The mean value of industry type indicates that 36% of the sample 
companies operate in the industrial sectors. Table 2 also shows that the mean value of 
dividends ratio is 17.6%, with minimum and maximum values of 0 and 97.5% respectively, 
and correspondingly the median value is 0 with a standard deviation of 29.9%. Concerning 
the other control variables, board size has a mean value 8.011, which is consistent with other 
studies (Peasnell et al. 2005; Sartawi et al. 2014). A dummy variable of board duality has a 
mean of 20.5%. This figure is lower than the average reported by Chau and Gray (2010), who 
found that the mean value among Hong Kong listed companies is 54%. Numbers of meeting 
and board independence have mean values of 7.572 and 2.020 respectively. Concerning 
ownership structure, managerial and family ownership have 35.5% and 61.2% mean values 
respectively, while institutions and blockholders are 35.5% and 48.92%. 
 
Insert Table 2 about Descriptive Statistics here 
 
Following descriptive analysis of the variables, Table 3 shows the correlation of coefficients 
between the independent and control variables of the period 2008–2013. The correlation 
matrix shows that the highest correlation is between board independence and board size, with 
a coefficient of 41.50%. Table 3 also indicates that no Pearson’s coefficient is more that 80%, 
so there is no multicollinearity problem among the independent variables (Gujarati 2008).  
 
Insert Table 3 about Correlation Matrix here
 Table 4 reports the results of random-effect panel regression. The estimates are presented in 
three panels: panel A reports the results for the regressions where overconfidence is measured 
using the ‘Net Buyer’ method, and panels B and C represent the overconfidence variable 
based on capital expenditures and leverage ratio respectively. The combination of the 
independent variables shows respectively 25.69%, 38.3% and 23.45% of the variation of the 
dependent variable. The P-Value is highly significant at the level (F = 12.05, p > .00), 
implying that the model has a good explanatory power of disclosure. The table also shows 
that CEO overconfidence has a high significant effect on the level of FLI disclosure at levels 
(t = 2.11, P > .035, t = 2.46, P > .014 and t = 8.06, P > .00) based on the three methods 
(respectively), suggesting that confident managers are risk takers (Malmendier and Tate 
2005a). This result supports a positive and significant relation between the level of FLI 
disclosed and CEO overconfidence, consistent with Francis et al. (2008a) and Demerjian et 
al. (2012), who found a positive relationship between a CEO reputation and managerial talent 
as proxies for  overconfidence and financial reporting quality measured by the level of 
voluntary disclosure.  
In addition, this result corroborates Hribar and Yang (2010), who found a positive 
relationship between a CEO overconfidence and voluntary forecasts, consistent with the 
upper echelons theory perspective, which suggests that specific personal characteristics of top 
management affect the decision-making process (Hambrick 2007). A possible explanation for 
these findings is that overconfident managers are more likely to be more optimistic about 
future circumstances. Thus, the results of the three panels support H1, in agreement with the 
agency theory perspective, which suggested that disclosures may be a tool for managers to 
convince stockholders about their optimal behaviour in response to the owner’s attempt to 
control their activities through bonding and monitoring actions (Watson et al. 2002). 
The significantly positive coefficient at level (t = 2.11, P > .034, t = 2.01, P >.044, and t = 
2.69, P < .007) of CEO gender indicates that companies managed by male CEOs are 
associated with more FLI disclosure than those managed by female CEOs. This finding 
confirms that gender diversity is one of the attributes influencing the voluntary information 
disclosures in annual reports (Gibbins et al. 1990; Nalikka 2009). This result supports H2, 
which proposes a significant relationship between the level of FLI disclosure and CEO 
gender, consistent with prior studies (Siciliano 1996; Erhardt et al. 2003). It consistent with 
signalling theory, which posits that managers are more likely to disclose more and certain 
information to signal that they are better than other managers, for the purpose of enhancing 
their personal reputation (Campbell et al. 2001).  
In respect to CEO age, we documented a negative significant coefficient (t = -3.19, P < -
.001, t = -3.61, P < -.001, and t = -2.48, P < -.013), which implies a significant relationship 
between the level of FLI disclosure and CEO age. This finding is consistent with Bamber et 
al. (2010), who reported that older CEOs are less likely to issue forecasts than younger ones. 
This finding is also consistent with several studies that reported a significant negative 
association between CEO age and other factors, such as investment decisions (Serfling 2012; 
Yim 2013). The results of this study indicate that older managers tend to avoid risks more 
than younger managers, whereas younger managers tend to reveal their capability to 
stakeholders. This result is consistent with signalling theory: managers are more likely to 
make more FLI disclosures to the interest-related parties, to increase those parties’ 
confidence about the company’s future performance (Singhvi and Desai 1971), therefore 
making more FLI disclosure will provide stakeholders with greater and value-relevant 
information to assist them in making rational decisions (Qu et al. 2015).  
This finding is also in line with suggestions that the desire to keep their position will result in 
a greater likelihood of information disclosure by younger CEOs (Hu and Kumar 2004), and 
with several studies that reported a significant negative association between the CEO age and 
other factors such as investment decisions (Serfling 2012; Yim 2013). The results of this 
study indicate that older managers tend to avoid risks more than younger managers, whereas 
younger managers tend to reveal their capability to the stakeholders.   
With regard to the control variables, the regression results indicate that a firm’s dividend has 
a highly positive association with the level of FLI disclosure, consistent with signalling 
theory, which affirms that companies are more likely to pay a higher dividend and disclose 
additional information voluntarily to meet the demands of financial analysts (Firth 1979; 
Haniffa and Cooke 2005; Celik et al. 2006; Lim et al. 2007; Kelton and Yang 2008). With 
regard to institutional ownership, the coefficient of this variable is significant and negatively  
related to the level of FLI. Conversely, company size, profitability, industry type, board 
characteristics, managerial ownership, family ownership and blockholder ownership are 
found to have an insignificant influence on the level of FLI disclosure.  
Regression results challenge the relationship between these variables and level of FLI 
disclosure. Our findings are consistent with Barako et al. (2006) and Aljifri (2008) who 
reported an insignificant relationship between the level of FLI disclosure and profitability. 
This seems to support the theory that profitable firms are not motivated to disclose more 
voluntary information because their investors are already satisfied (Wallace and Naser 1996).  
Insert Table 4 about Regression Analysis here 
 
4.1 Dealing with Endogeneity 
In order to address the endogeneity problem, this study used the lagged values of the 
endogenous independent variable ‘CEO characteristics’ as an instrumental variable (IV), to 
examine whether or not the simultaneity problem affects the association between FLI 
disclosure and CEO characteristics (Coles et al. 2008; McKnight and Weir 2009; Choi et al. 
2010). 
Durbin and Housman tests were run to check endogeneity bias for the endogenous and 
independent variables (Gujarati 2008). Both tests gave an X2 of 5.68 % and 5.67% (P < 
0.0172, P < 0.0176) respectively, which suggests that the null hypothesis (of no endogeneity 
between CEO characteristics as independent variable and FLI disclosure as the dependent 
variable) is rejected. Thus, the presence of this problem might affect the results. Therefore, 
instrumental variable two-stage regression was used to control for the endogeneity and 
simultaneity problems.  
The results of the two-stage (2SLS) regression of FLI disclosure on CEO characteristics are 
presented in Table 5, panels A and B. After controlling for the simultaneity, the coefficient of 
FLI disclosure is significant and positively related to CEO overconfidence at level (t = 4.70, 
P < .001, and t = 2.97,  P < .003), which suggests that these results are consistent with the 
main findings in Table 4, panels A and B. The coefficient of CEO gender is significant and 
positively associated with the level of FLI disclosure at level (t = 6.64, P < .001, and t = 
4.84, P < .000). The two-stage regression analysis shows similar results to the panel 
regression in Table 4. In addition, the coefficient of FLI disclosure is significant and 
negatively related to CEO age at levels (t = -2.40, P < -.016, and t = -2.53, P < -.011). This 
result is in line with the previous results of the panel-regression random effect model reported 
in Table 4, panels A and B. Regarding the control variables, the results show similar results. 
However, although some coefficient values reveal significant high levels, the direction and 
significance of the association with FLI disclosure remain the same. 
In summary, the instrumental variable two-stage model’s results are consistent with the 
primary results presented in Table 4, panels A and B, indicating that the simultaneity problem 
between FLI disclosure and CEO characteristics does not affect the main results of FLI 
disclosure or other control variables. 
Insert Table 5 about Instrumental Variable here 
 
5 Conclusion 
The paper examined the effect of a CEO characteristics on the level of FLI disclosures in 
Jordanian listed companies during the period 2008 to 2013, motivated by findings reported in 
the literature that the financial reporting process varies predictably with particular individual 
characteristics of CEOs. We found that 95% of the sample were managed by male and 5% by 
female CEOs, and that the majority of Jordanian companies are family-owned. However, the 
limited number of female CEOs still surpasses the averages of around 3% in Brazil, 
Botswana, Ireland, Japan, New Zealand and the UAE (Grant Thornton International Business 
Report, 2012). The overall results indicate that CEO overconfidence and gender have a 
positive and a significant association with the level of FLI disclosure. The regression further 
shows a significant negative association between the level of FLI disclosure and the CEO 
age, suggesting that older CEOs are less likely to issue forecasts than younger CEOs. This 
finding is consistent with the entrenchment theory perspective, which suggests that the desire 
to keep their position will result in a greater likelihood of more information disclosure by 
younger CEOs (Hu and Kumar 2004). We find a positive association between the level of 
FLI and the dividends ratio of the company, but a negative relationship between institutional 
ownership and the level of FLI disclosure, and no relationship with firm characteristics such 
as profitability, industry type or company size, board characteristics, managerial ownership, 
family ownership and blockholders ownership.   
In the real world, a large number of companies have concerns about the possible implications 
of FLI disclosure on their competitive advantage, irrespective of its impact on investor 
understanding. This is true in countries such as Jordan, where the right to run the companies 
rests with managers, and FLI disclosure is generally taken with a pinch of salt. Moreover, as 
the financial statements do not provide the required information for investors to make 
economic decisions, the increasing acceptance of FLI disclosures would bring more trust 
among investors in the Jordanian capital market. Since there is no clearly defined structure 
for FLI disclosures, it is the prerogative of the company to decide on the nature of the 
information to be included. However, the development of good home-grown practices in FLI 
disclosure requires substantial educative measures at the national level on the implications of 
sound FLI disclosure.  
The findings of the study should be of interest to policymakers, regulators and academics 
regarding the impact of CEO characteristics on the level of FLI disclosure in Jordan and in  
other countries in the region. Further, the findings of this study are likely to be of interest to 
investors, since this study introduces new empirical evidence about the level of FLD in 
Jordan. The findings provide empirical evidence that enables managers to assess their 
financial transparency and accountability, in turn helping firms to improve investors’ 
perceptions of the quality of financial reporting. From a practice point of view, the managers 
need to give priority to publish voluntary disclosures in the intended spirit. However, these 
findings are based on non-financial companies only, and future studies could focus on the 
financial sector, which plays an increasingly important role in developing economies, 
particularly Jordan, which is a bridgehead of market liberalization in MENA. These results 
are not indicative of other countries, even within the Middle East, because of Jordan’s unique 
liberalization and other factors.  
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Appendix 1: Compliance with the Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
Principles: Jordan and the World 
 
Source: Alwshah (2009, P. 22). 
Appendix 2: List of 35 Forward-Looking Key Words 
Number Forward-Looking Key words 
1 Accelerate 
2 Anticipate 
3 Await 
4 Coming financial year(s) 
5 Coming months 
6 Confidence (or confident) 
7 Convince 
8 Current financial year 
9 Envisage 
10 Estimate 
11 Eventual 
12 Expect 
13 Forecast 
14 Forthcoming 
15 Hope 
16 Intend (or intention) 
17 Likely (or unlikely) 
18 Look forward (or look ahead) 
19 Next 
20 Novel 
21 Optimistic 
22 Outlook 
23 Planned (or planning) 
24 Predict 
25 Prospect 
26 Remain 
27 Renew 
28 Scope for (or scope to) 
29 Shall 
30 Shortly 
31 Should 
32 Soon 
33 Will 
34 Well placed (or well positioned) 
35 Year(s) ahead 
Source: (Hussainey et al. 2003, P. 277). 
 
Appendix 3: FLI disclosure Categories and Items 
 Financial FLI items 
• Income 
• Profit 
• Loss 
• Cash flow 
• Capital 
• Return on equity 
• Sales 
• Capital expenditures 
• Production 
• Cost 
• Expenses 
 
 Non-Financial FLI items 
Strategies items: 
• Goals for performance 
• Mission 
• Objectives 
 
 Company structure 
• Financial structure 
• Change in ownership 
• Industry type 
• Human and intellectual capital 
• Mergers and acquisitions 
• Technological structure 
 
 Environment 
• Legal and regulatory 
• Political 
• Economic conditions 
• Social responsibility 
• Competitive position 
• Financial and non-financial resources 
• Risks 
• Relationship 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 
Sample Description 
Description 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Pooled 
Initial sample 270 270 270 270 270 270 1620 
Excluded: 
Financial industries 42 42 42 42 42 42 (252) 
Non-financial industries 228 228 228 228 228 228 1326 
Industries with fewer than six firms 
Health care 4 4 4 4 4 4 24 
Technology and communication 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 
Media 2 2 2 2 2 2 12 
Paper and cardboard 3 3 3 3 3 3 18 
Utilities and energy 3 3 3 3 3 3 18 
Printing and packaging 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 
Tobacco and cigarettes 2 2 2 2 2 2 12 
Glass and ceramic industries 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 
  (102) 
Firms with unavailable data 10 10 10 10 10 10 (60) 
Final sample 201 201 201 201 201 201 1206 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2  
Descriptive Statistics: Dependent and Independent Variables 
Variables N Minimum Maximum Mean Median Std. Deviation 
FLI  1206 .00 .78 .316 .33 .149 
COVER  1206 0 1 .43 .00 .499 
CAPEX 1206 0 1 .497 1 .410 
LEVER  1206 .0020 .977 .294 .240 .233 
CGEN  1206 0 1 .95 1 .170 
CAGE  1206 26 84 51.11 51.00 11.312 
FSIZE  1206 .93e+03 3.23e+09 5.55e+07 1.87e+07 1.57e+08 
FPROF  1206 -.859 .950 -.001 .009 .125 
FINDU 
FDIVID  
1206 
1206 
1 
0 
20 
.975 
.363 
.176 
.240 
0 
.481 
.299 
BSIZE 1206 3 19 8.011 7 2.4494 
BDUAL 1206 0 1 .2056 0 .40433 
BMEET 1206 3 28 7.5729 7 2.1378 
BINDEP 1206 0 8 2.0207 2 1.2345 
MOWNE 1206 0 .7185 .03528 0 .08595 
FOWNE 1206 0 .9450 0.6127 .15472 .27206 
INSTIT 1206 0 1 .35547 .3320 .76537 
BLOCK 1206 0 1 .48922 0 .50009 
Valid N  1206      
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Table 4 
Panel A. CEO Overconfidence Measured by ‘Net Buyer’ 
Variables Expected sign Coefficient. t Prob.  
COVER + .0239732 2.11 0.035**  
CGEN + .0610475 2.11 0.034**  
CAGE - -.0015846 -3.19 -0.001***  
FSIZE + 3.43e-11 0.82 0.411  
FPROF + .0322521 0.70 0.485  
FINDU 
FDIVID 
? 
? 
.0065221 
.0586593 
0.07 
3.14 
0.918 
0.002*** 
 
BSIZE ? -.0027823 -0.88 0.377  
BDUAL + .0075602 0.44 0.659  
BMEET ? .0014005 0.50 0.618  
BINDEP - .0069712 1014 .0252  
MOWNE + .0520774 0.67 0.501  
FOWNE ? -.0000245 -0.13 0.895  
INSTIT ? -.0591668 -2.33 0.020**  
BLOCK - -.0047866 -0.41 0.683  
Cons  .3490898 4.74 0.000***  
R Sq. value         25.69% 
P. value                0.0000 
 
Panel B. CEO Overconfidence Measured by Capital Expenditure 
Variables Expected sign Coefficient. t Prob.   
COVER + .0279078 2.46 0.014**   
CGEN + .0581859 2.01 0.044**   
CAGE - -.0017858 -3.61 0.001***   
FSIZE + 4.56e-11 1.08 0.278   
FPROF + .0269114 0.58 0.559   
FINDU 
FDIVID 
? 
? 
-3.27e-12 
.0649896 
-0.23 
3.52 
0.817 
0.001*** 
  
BSIZE 
BDUAL 
BMEET 
BINDEP 
MOWNE 
FOWNE 
INSTIT 
BLOCK 
? 
+ 
? 
- 
+ 
? 
? 
- 
-.0032706 
.0016278 
.0011094 
.0076598 
-.0477566 
-.0000157 
-.0597762 
-.0045131 
-1.04 
0.09 
0.39 
1.26 
0.62 
-0.08 
-2.42 
-0.38 
 
0.300 
0.925 
0.693 
0.209 
0.538 
0.932 
0.019*** 
0.701 
  
Cons  .3525791 9.31 0.001***   
R Sq. value 38.30%      
P. value 0.0001      
Panel C. CEO Overconfidence Measured by Leverage 
Variables Expected sign Coefficient. t Prob.   
COVER + .1918623 8.06 0.000***   
CGEN + .0415782 2.69 0.007***   
CAGE - -.0011973 -2.48 0.013***   
FSIZE + 2.78e-11 0.68 0.494   
FPROF + .0867602 1.90 0.058**   
FINDU 
FDIVID 
? 
? 
9.16e-13 
.0502298 
0.07 
2.78 
0.946 
0.005*** 
  
BSIZE ? -.0029124 -0.95 0.343   
BDUAL + .0079785 0.48 0.633   
BMEET ? .0016117 0.59 0.556   
BINDEP - .0042051 0.71 0.478   
MOWNE + .0419184 0.56 0.578   
FOWNE ? .0000534 0.30 0.767   
INSTIT ? -.0482082 -1.95 0.052**   
BLOCK - -.0252158 -1.82 0.069*   
Cons  .3061779 8.15 0.000***   
R Sq. value 23.45%      
P. value 0.000      
 
Table 5 
Panel A. Instrumental Variable: CEO Overconfidence Measured by ‘Net Buyer’ 
Variables Expected sign Coefficient. t Prob.  
LCOVER + .1060139 4.70 0.001***  
LCGEN + .3024688 6.64 0.001***  
LCAGE - -.0025205 -2.40 0.016***  
FSIZE + 2.37e-10 6.51 0.001***  
FPROF + -.067299 -1.64 0.101*  
FINDU 
FDIVID 
? 
? 
6.92e-12 
.0727807 
0.82 
4.30 
0.413 
0.000*** 
 
BSIZE ? .0040664 1.99 0.047**  
BDUAL + .0140643 1018 0.237  
BMEET ? -.0011452 -0.55 0.584  
BINDEP - .005462 1.33 0.183  
MOWNE + -.0587541 -1.07 0.285  
FOWNE ? -.0479093 -2.51 0.012**  
INSTIT ? -.0467553 -2.76 0.006***  
BLOCK - -.0008176 -0.09 0.929  
Cons  .2858471 11.13 0.000***  
R Sq. value 78%     
P. value 0.000     
Panel B. CEO Overconfidence Measured by Capital Expenditure 
Variables Expected sign Coefficient. t Prob.  
LCOVER + .1545815 2.97 0.003***  
LCGEN + .2287371 4.84 0.000***  
LCAGE - -.0026513 -2.53 0.011***  
FSIZE + 2.32e-10 5.91 0.000***  
FPROF + .1621363 2.32 0.020**  
FINDU 
FDIVID 
? 
? 
6.92e-12 
.0744217 
0.84 
4.08 
0.400 
0.000*** 
 
BSIZE ? .0051425 2.34 0.020***  
BDUAL + .0187075 1.46 0.145  
BMEET ? -.002104 -0.93 0.351  
BINDEP - .0032182 0.73 0.467  
MOWNE + -.0742387 .0592357 0.210  
FOWNE ? -.0730847 -3.55 0.000***  
INSTIT ? -.045036 -2.47 0.014***  
BLOCK - .0067907 0.69 0.492  
Cons  .2746264 9.91 0.000***  
R Sq. value 75.50%     
P. value 0.000     
 
 
 
 
  
 
